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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW—CLEAN WATER ACT—THE “MIGRATORY 
BIRD RULE” EXCEEDS THE AUTHORITY GRANTED TO THE UNITED 
STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS UNDER SECTION 404(a) OF THE 
CLEAN WATER ACT—Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United 
States Army Corps of Engineers, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001). 
A consortium comprised of twenty-three suburban Chicago 
municipalities, the Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County 
(SWANCC), sought to develop land formerly used in a sand and 
gravel mining operation as a disposal site for baled nonhazardous 
solid waste.  Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States 
Army Corps of Engineers, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001).  SWANCC filed for, 
and received, permits from both the State of Illinois and Cook 
County for the proposed disposal operation.  SWANCC also 
contacted the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to determine 
whether the Clean Water Act (CWA) required SWANCC to secure a 
federal landfill permit because it was planned to fill-in ponds on the 
site.  After first concluding that it had no jurisdiction because the 
site did not contain “wetlands,” the Corps reversed its decision and 
ultimately asserted jurisdiction under the “Migratory Bird Rule” 
after learning that the area was used as a habitat by several 
migratory bird species.  Although SWANCC received approval 
from the appropriate state authorities and offered several proposals 
to mitigate the likely harm to various bird species, the Corps denied 
SWANCC a permit under section 404(a) of the CWA, citing 
probable environmental damage, risk to the area’s drinking water 
supply, and the likely negative impact on migratory bird species. 
SWANCC sought relief in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois.  Id. at 679.  Presented with a challenge 
to both the Corps’ jurisdiction over the proposed dump site and the 
merits of the Corps’ refusal to issue the section 404(a) permit, the 
District Court granted summary judgment to the Corps with regard 
to jurisdiction.  Id.  SWANCC thereafter withdrew its challenge to 
the merits of the Corps’ refusal to issue the permit.  Id.  Thereafter, 
SWANCC appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  
Id.  On appeal, SWANCC launched a two-pronged attack.  Id.  
SWANCC first argued that, in promulgating the “Migratory Bird 
Rule,” the Corps had gone beyond its statutory authority by 
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interpreting the scope of the CWA to include non-navigable, 
intrastate  
 
bodies of water.  Id.  Alternatively, SWANCC argued that the 
Commerce Clause did not support Congress’ grant of such 
jurisdiction to the Corps.  Id. 
Turning to the constitutional issue first, the court of appeals 
held that the regulation of such waters was within Congress’ 
authority based on the cumulative impact doctrine.  Id.  The court of 
appeals explained that under the cumulative impact doctrine, “a 
single activity that itself has no discernible effect on interstate 
commerce may still be regulated if the aggregate effect of that class 
of activity has a substantial impact on interstate commerce.”  Id. 
(citation and internal quotes omitted).  The court held that the 
aggregate effect of the potential damage to various migratory bird 
species on interstate commerce was substantial given the fact that a 
significant number of Americans spend billions of dollars and travel 
across state lines to observe and hunt such birds.  Id.  With respect to 
the “Migratory Bird Rule,” the court of appeals stated that, in light 
of the court’s expansive reading of the Commerce Clause, the Corps’ 
“Migratory Bird Rule” constituted a reasonable interpretation of the 
CWA.  Id. at 679-80. 
Upon SWANCC’s petition, the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and reversed.  Id. at 680.  The Court held that in 
promulgating and applying the “Migratory Bird Rule,” the Corps 
had exceeded the authority granted to it by section 404(a) of the 
CWA.  Id. 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist began the 
Court’s analysis by noting that in passing the CWA, Congress 
sought to protect the integrity of the country’s waters while 
preserving the States’ primary rights and responsibilities in 
eliminating pollution and planning for the development of both 
land and water resources.  Id.  The Court observed that section 
404(a) of the CWA authorizes the Corps to regulate the disposal of 
waste into “navigable waters,” defined by the statute as “the waters 
of the United States, including the territorial seas.”  Id. (quoting 33 
U.S.C. § 1362(7)).  The Court concluded that the Corps’ 
interpretation of the CWA to include isolated waters that serve as a 
habitat for migratory birds is not supported by the language of the 
statute.  Id. 
The majority next distinguished this case from United States v. 
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), in which the Court 
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held that the Corps had properly asserted 404(a) jurisdiction over an 
intrastate wetlands area.  Id.  In contrasting the two cases, the Court 
emphasized that the waters in Riverside Bayview abutted a navigable 
waterway, while the ponds in this case were not situated near any 
open water.  Id. 
 
 
Turning to the question of Congressional acquiescence with 
regard to the “Migratory Bird Rule,” the Chief Justice observed that 
the Corps’ original interpretation of the CWA contradicted its 
interpretation of the statute in this case.  Id.  The Corps’ original 
definition of “navigable waters,” the court observed, stated that the 
determining factor was the water’s ability to be used by the public 
for transportation or commerce.  Id. 
The Court also rejected the Corps’ argument that Congress 
ultimately approved of the Corps’ more expansive definition of the 
term “navigable,” as evidenced by both the failure to pass a bill that 
would have overturned the Corps regulations, and the passage of 
404(g), which extends the Corps’ jurisdiction to waterways other 
than those considered traditional navigable waters.  Id. at 681.  The 
majority voiced its reluctance to interpret a present statute based on 
a failed legislative proposal.  Id. (citations omitted).  Finding that the 
Corps had produced “no persuasive evidence that the House bill 
was proposed in response to the Corps’ claim of jurisdiction over 
nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate, waters,” the Chief Justice 
concluded that the Corps fell short of carrying its burden of 
showing that the failure of the bill signaled Congress’ acceptance of 
the Corps’ regulations.  Id. at 682. 
Examining the text of section 404(g), the majority stated that the 
exact definition of the term “other . . . waters” was unclear.  Id.  The 
Court observed that “other . . . waters” could mean the types of 
isolated waters the Corps sought to regulate under the “Migratory 
Bird Rule,” or it could signify waterways adjacent to navigable 
bodies of water.  Id.  Given this ambiguity, the Court found that 
“‘§404(g)(1) does not conclusively determine the construction to be 
placed on the term “waters” elsewhere in the Act . . . .’”  Id. (quoting 
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 138 n.11). 
Further, the Chief Justice voiced the Court’s refusal to read the 
word “navigable” out of the statute by relying solely on the 
definitional phrase “waters of the United States.”  Id.  The majority 
acknowledged that in Riverside Bayview the Court indicated that the 
term “navigable” in the CWA was of “limited effect,” not 
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ineffective.  Id. at 682-83.  The Court asserted that the term remained 
important as a sign that, in passing the CWA, Congress had relied 
on its traditional authority to regulate navigable waters.  Id. at 683. 
The Chief Justice then proceeded to address the Corps’ 
argument that Congress had never specifically answered the 
question of the scope of section 404(a), and thus the Court should 
give deference to the Corps’ regulations.  Id.  The Court declined to 
defer to the Corps’ rules because the Corps’ interpretation of the 
CWA reached the furthermost boundaries of Congress’ power.  Id.  
The majority explained that, in the absence of clear congressional 
intent, the Court would construe the Act to avoid Constitutional 
issues, especially when such construction implicated a change in the 
traditional federal-state balance.  Id.  The Court further noted that 
the “Migratory Bird Rule” presented such a quandary given that the 
power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause is not 
unlimited, and there remained the question of whether migratory 
birds “substantially affect” interstate commerce.  Id.  The Court thus 
held that the Corps’ application of the Migratory Bird Rule to 
SWANCC’s disposal site exceeded the power granted to the Corps 
under the CWA.  Id. at 684. 
Writing for the dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, began by observing that Congress 
enacted the CWA with the lofty goal of terminating water pollution 
by 1985.  Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Given that Congress’ hope 
remains unfulfilled, the dissent lamented that the majority’s 
decision would serve only to weaken the Nation’s most important 
safeguard against polluted water.  Id. 
The dissent then traced the history of federal water regulation.  
Id. at 685 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens described the shift 
in legislative focus from protecting the navigability of waterways in 
the nineteenth century, to preventing environmental damage to the 
country’s waters in the twentieth century.  Id. at 685-86 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  Noting that the CWA “was universally described by its 
supporters as the first truly comprehensive federal water pollution 
legislation,” the dissent asserted that the passage of the Act in 1972 
marked the climax in this movement toward environmental 
protection.  Id. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent contrasted 
section 404 of the CWA with section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors 
Appropriation Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1152, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 
407 (RHA).  Id. at 687 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The dissent stated 
that, although the two statutes were similar in some respects, the 
statutes differed markedly with respect to purpose, as evidenced by 
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surveys and studies for improvements in navigation facilities 
contained in the RHA, and by large appropriations for research on 
water pollution control in the CWA.  Id.  The dissent emphasized 
that in creating the CWA, Congress had carried over the traditional 
term “navigable waters,” as used in the RHA, but had deliberately 
expanded the definition of the term to include all “waters of the 
United States.”  Id. 
The dissent reminded the Court that the new definition “was 
intended to be given the broadest possible constitutional 
interpretation.”  Id. (citation and internal quotes omitted).  The 
dissent reasoned that, in recording its desire for broad 
interpretation, Congress could not have been referring to its 
authority over navigation, which had long been established as a core 
power under the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 687-88 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  Rather, the dissent noted, Congress referred to 
jurisdiction well beyond that traditional territory.  Id.  at 688 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  The dissent  
 
maintained that it was Congress, not the Corps, that had read the 
term “navigable” out of the CWA when it deleted the word from the 
statutory definition.  Id. 
Justice Stevens explained that it was this broadened definition 
of the Corps’ jurisdiction, which was clarified in interim regulations 
adopted in 1975 and in final regulations adopted in 1977, which 
sparked opposition from some Members of Congress.  Id. at 688-89 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  The dissent observed that a bill restricting 
the Corps’ section 404 authority to only those waters used for 
interstate or foreign commerce was passed by the House, but was 
ultimately rejected by the Senate in 1977.  Id. at 690 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  The dissent interpreted this failed legislation, as well as 
the informed debate surrounding the proposal, as a clear sign that 
Congress accepted the Corps’ expanded jurisdiction under the Act.  
Id.  Moreover, the dissent declared that the Court’s finding of 
congressional acquiescence to the same regulations in Riverside 
Bayview foreclosed any contrary conclusion.  Id. 
Accusing the majority of selective reading, the dissent stated 
that in Riverside Bayview the Court held that the Corps regulations at 
issue were entitled to administrative deference under Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Id. 
at 693 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens urged that the 
majority’s concerns regarding federalism were misplaced because 
the CWA is not a land-use statute, but rather an environmental 
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regulation that explicitly encourages local control by allowing States 
to develop their own regulatory programs to take the place of 
federal control.  Id. 
Turning to the issue of whether Congress has the power under 
the Commerce Clause to regulate SWANCC’s proposed disposal 
site, the dissent identified three categories of activities that Congress 
may regulate pursuant to its commerce power: “(1) channels of 
interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or 
persons and things in interstate commerce; and (3) activities that 
‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce.”  Id. at 694 (citing United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995)) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
The dissent indicated that the “Migratory Bird Rule” fell into the 
third category, which does not require that each instance of the 
activity substantially affect interstate commerce, merely that the 
activity taken as a whole have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.  Id.  (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971)).  
Noting the intrinsic value of migratory birds, as well as the 
significant commercial value of both bird-watching and hunting, the 
dissent determined that the disposal of fill into the SWANCC site 
would substantially affect interstate commerce.  Id.  at 695 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting).  Furthermore, the dissent characterized the 
preservation of migratory birds as a “textbook example of a national 
problem.”  Id.  Justice Stevens stated that, like other environmental 
problems, the damage to the bird habitat would result in 
disproportionately local benefits, such as the new disposal site, 
while the costs (fewer birds) would be widely dispersed.  Id.  
Finally, the dissent observed that the federal government’s 
responsibility for protecting migratory birds is well established, and 
given the birds’ transitory nature, national action stands as the only 
effective means of fulfilling that duty.  Id. at 696 (Stevens, J. 
dissenting).  Thus, the dissent concluded that the regulation of the 
“isolated” waters in this case was well within Congress’ authority 
under the Commerce Clause.  Id. 
The majority’s opinion is deceptively appealing in its 
simplicity.  The dissent’s more detailed and in-depth analysis, 
however, is more cogent.  Congress clearly intended the Corps’ 
jurisdiction to extend to waters not considered navigable in an effort 
to formulate a truly comprehensive environmental protection 
program.  The Court’s opinion may ignore Congress’ intent, leaving 
wetlands across the country exposed to potentially irreversible 
environmental degradation.  Moreover, although the majority 
declined to rest its opinion on the Commerce Clause issue, the 
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Court’s dicta regarding Congress’ commerce power is disconcerting.  
The Court’s reading of Congress’ authority under the Commerce 
Clause as more limited than traditionally defined may foreshadow a 
narrowing judicial scrutiny of legislation passed pursuant to the 
commerce power, including other environmental measures and civil 
rights legislation. 
Jennifer Mara 
 
